The secret stats

When Bill James started his pioneering work some three decades ago, he was consistently denied access to the scorecards. The Elias Bureau, baseball's official statisticians, had them, and they wouldn't share the information with an outsider for love or money.

That attitude ultimately led James and others to start Project Scoresheet, which led to the creation of STATS Inc. and Baseball Info Systems, and, along other tangents, to Retrosheet and Baseball Reference. If you want play-by-play info from games gone by — what James sought to buy from Elias in the 1980s — it's on the web, and it's free.

For a good while, there was more sophisticated baseball information available to the fans than the teams, or at least a good many of them, themselves took advantage of. That's past now.

Let somebody start doing some innovative Pitch fx analysis and start posting the results on a website, and pretty soon a tech-savvy organization will call, offer the analyst a job — and order the site shut down. You work for us now. James himself works for the Red Sox, and he is limited in what he can share with the public as a result — and he was, after the struggle with Elias, outspoken about his desire for openness in baseball research.

This came to mind while reading this Thomas Boswell column from the weekend about the Washington Nationals offseason. This is Nats GM Mike Rizzo talking about the trade for Doug Fister:

The Nats statistical analysts consider Fister (14-9) a virtual duplicate of [Jordan] Zimmermann right down to “average velocity off the bat.”

“They do it differently, Zimmermann with velocity, Fister with movement. But they get the same results,” Rizzo said.

Average velocity off the bat.  Boswell cites Fister's won-lost record out of habit, but that's not what gets Rizzo revved up. It's how hard batters hit the ball off Fister — and Rizzo has actual data to back it up.

And it's not information available to the masses.

Most — maybe all — teams have their own statistical systems to evaluate defense. We outsiders have access to such metrics as ultimate zone rating and plus-minus; the teams have that access too, plus their own analysis.

We're back where we were when I started following baseball, when the people running the teams truly knew more than even the most sophisticated fans did. For a good part of my adult life, that hasn't necessarily been the case.

As a Twins fan, I just hope this development isn't leaving my team behind. I have, truly, no idea if Terry Ryan and the people advising him know what the average velocity off the bat is for Ricky Nolasco, or even for Sam Deduno. I do know they'd be better off with the knowledge than without.

Dissecting the Bill Smith era: Statistical analysis

Despite his lack of a traditional scouting background,
Bill Smith didn't lead the Twins deeper into sabermetrics.

The Twins have a reputation for leaning far more heavily on traditional tools scouting than on new-wave statistical analysis. Terry Ryan, the once and current general manager, wishes to dispute that to a degree (at least in a Jim Souhan interview/column last week; no link because of the StarTribune's paywall), but I'm not completely buying it.

I have a certain sympathy with Ryan's general criticism of defensive metrics:

Defense is a difficult thing to quantify. And sometimes, what the statistic says about range, your eyes don't agree with.

Yeah. Like Delmon Young's suddenly solid scores in last season's Twins tenure.

But I don't think it helps the Twins to operate in ignorance of the metrics either. In that regard, I look at the infield portion of the much-reviled Matt Garza-Young trade (made by Bill Smith soon after he became general manager).

I've always, and simplistically, viewed the deal as three swaps: Garza for Young; Jason Bartlett for Brendan Harris; Eduardo Morlan for Jason Pridie. First-round pick for first-round pick, shortstop for shortstop, minor leaguer for minor leaguer.

Viewed that way, the Twins and Rays were basically even on the first and third parts. The Rays won the shortstop part, won it huge, and I think it was because the Twins (and specifically Ron Gardenhire) undervalued Bartlett's defense and didn't fully understand Harris' defensive limitations. The Rays were, and remain, more attuned to the metrics.

The same problem may be revealing itself in the rumored but not-yet-confirmed signing of Jamey Carroll with the intent of making him the regular shortstop. The metrics offer some red flags.

Ryan told Souhan that the Twins are more aware of the stats than they were two years ago, far more aware than they were 10 years ago. Perhaps. But in several ways -- the decision, for example, to commit long-term dollars to Nick Blackburn -- they show themselves to be not only behind much of the rest of baseball in the stats field, but oblivious to some of the most basic findings of the world opened by Bill James.

One can understand the reluctance of a skilled eyeball scout -- and Ryan is certainly that -- to embrace a line of thought that often is depicted as demeaning to his trade. Nobody wants to see his work devalued. Smith, on the other hand, doesn't have the scouting background of Ryan and Mike Radcliff. His failure to more fully grasp the implications of statistical research represents a missed opportunity for the franchise.

Two open eyes will see more than one.